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Vaccination and outbreak monitoring are essential tools for preventing and minimizing out-
breaks of infectious diseases1–8. Targeted strategies, where the individuals most important
for monitoring or preventing outbreaks are selected for intervention, offer a possibility to
significantly improve these measures5, 7, 9. Although targeted strategies carry a strong poten-
tial, identifying optimal target groups remains a challenge5, 10. Here we consider the problem
of identifying target groups based on digital communication networks (telecommunication,
online social media) in order to predict and contain an infectious disease spreading on a real-
world person-to-person network of more than 500 individuals. We show that target groups
for efficient outbreak monitoring can be determined based on both telecommunication and
online social network information. In case of vaccination the information regarding the digi-
tal communication networks improves the efficacy for short-range disease transmissions but,
surprisingly, performance is severely reduced in the case of long-range transmission. These
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results are robust with respect to the strategy used to identify targeted individuals and time-
gap between identification of targets and the intervention. Thus, we demonstrate that data
available from telecommunication and online social networks can greatly improve epidemic
control measures, but it is important to consider the details of the pathogen spreading mech-
anism when such policies are applied.
Strategies for controlling and containing various infectious diseases have been actively devel-
oped in recent years, the two most prominent methods being targeted monitoring and vaccination5, 11, 12.
While full knowledge of the outbreak state (in case of monitoring and prediction) or full coverage
(in case of vaccination) are preferable, acquiring information about every individual in the popu-
lation of interest is rarely feasible5, 6. For this reason targeted strategies that involve interventions
focused on a small, carefully selected subpopulation have been recently considered5, 7, 9, 11, 13. It has
been shown that densely-connected populations, such as schools14, 15, universities5, or hospitals16,
play a major role in large outbreaks17, offering numerous paths for diseases to propagate through
society. At the same time, such cohesive communities can be used as a ‘petri dish’ for studying the
structure of internal contacts, making them especially interesting in epidemiological efforts. In case
of person-to-person transmission, direct identification of optimal target groups requires knowledge
of the structure of the physical contacts network, collection of which is usually a time-consuming
and complex task5, 14, 18, limiting the feasibility of this approach at scale. Communication net-
works, such as online social networks or call detail records (CDRs) provide an accessible proxy of
the structure of contacts among individuals, and immunization strategies that take advantage of the
structure of these networks have been suggested12. Due to the known topological differences be-
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tween communication networks and networks of person-to-person proximity contacts14, 18, 19, how-
ever, the value of digital communication networks for locating epidemiologically-relevant target
individuals is not yet understood.
Here we explore the extent to which we can utilize the structure of communication networks
to create effective epidemic interventions. We study a densely-connected population of 532 univer-
sity students, based on data from the Copenhagen Network Study (CNS), which includes records
of Facebook activity, call detail records, and Bluetooth scans collected with high temporal resolu-
tion over two years (details of the measurement are provided in Methods and in Ref.18. Using data
from multiple layers of social interactions captured in the CNS study, we show that communica-
tion networks can be used to predict which individuals are central in the person-to-person network
and are thus prime candidates for limiting epidemic spreading that depends on physical proximity.
Further, our results show that the efficacy of counter-measures based on communication network
target groups is strongly affected by the range of transmission: diseases that require very close en-
counters (similar to droplet spreading) can be effectively contained, whereas in case of long-range
transmissions (closer to airborne diseases) target individuals found using communication networks
play a less central role during an outbreak. We find that strategies based on communication net-
works are robust with respect to temporal changes, that is, target groups can be identified months
before an epidemic outbreak and still provide a significant improvement over interventions based
on randomly selected groups, provided that a disease spreads via short-range transmission.
Our analysis of physical proximity between individuals is based on two distinct networks
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which we call full- and short-range networks. These two networks correspond to contact sequences
of two physical proximity ranges, which can be regarded to be rough approximations for airborne
and droplet modes of pathogen transmission20–22. The full-range network contains all physical
proximity interactions between participants up to the full Bluetooth range (∼ 10-15 meters), while
short-range network is constrained to approximately 1 meter, based on received signal strength
indicator (RSSI)22, 23. Communication networks are created from Facebook interactions and CDRs.
All networks describe interactions within a single population of 532 participants over a period of
one month (see Methods). The temporal resolution of the physical proximity data is 5 minutes,
where a proximity interaction is included in a time binned network when the Bluetooth sensor
registers a contact in the corresponding period. The 5 minutes time scale has been shown to
capture the key dynamics of the person-to-person network14, 24. Here we show that it is possible to
extract information based solely on communication networks (Facebook and call networks) and to
apply that knowledge in a fundamentally different system, i.e., the network of physical interactions
supporting infectious disease spreading.
While activity in all four networks (full- and short-range proximity, Facebook, and call net-
works) follows distinct daily schedules and circadian rhythm, the maximum increase of intensity in
digital channels occurs outside of work periods: lunch breaks, evenings, and weekends (Fig. 1a).
Both full- and short-range networks of physical proximity feature remarkably higher edge den-
sity compared to social networks (Fig. 1b, c). The degree distributions of the person-to-person
networks are consistent with an approximate normal distribution, whereas those of the online so-
cial networks follow a power-law distribution, supported by both the Akaike information criteria
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and Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-of-fit based model selection, confirming earlier findings14, 18.
Basic structural characteristics of the static aggregated networks are shown in Table 1.
The proximity networks contain a large number of links (in the order of 105-106 across the
observation period), revealing a highly dynamic network of real world contacts, in contrast to
the digital communication networks exhibiting sparser and slower network dynamics. Figure 1d
shows how these differences are reflected in the time respecting network connectivity, where the
majority of nodes in the person-to-person networks can be reached in a relatively short time—over
40% in a day and over 95% in under a week—contrary to the digital communication networks
which require more than a month to be fully explored, as quantified by the invasion percolation
process with transmission probability 1 (Fig. 1d), i.e., a process that propagates from node to
node across every edge of the network without fail. When compared to the full-range network,
the short-range network includes only the most frequent contacts, suggesting a social tie22, 23, as
quantified by the slope of the invasion curve: after a natural delay in the invasion level (∼10
hours), a majority of the giant component in the short-range network can be explored in a shorter
time, meaning that most of the links describe frequent contacts in that network (black dashed lines
are included to highlight the slopes of the short- and long-range contact networks). The short-
range network therefore resembles social channels more closely than the full-range network and
we expect epidemic counter-measures based on the structure of communication networks to be
more efficient in case of short-range transmission than that in the full-range case. The distributions
of contact durations and waiting times (i.e., duration of time between two consecutive appearance
of a contact) in the proximity networks are in agreement with previous findings in the literature,
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showing long-tailed distributions25.
The robustness of the aggregated networks can be illustrated by the change in the size of
their giant component (i.e., the largest connected component in a graph) after the removal of a
random set of links as shown in Fig. 1e. When removing fedge fraction of the links randomly
from the network, physical proximity networks break down at a density close to that of the ran-
dom networks, whereas social networks become disconnected when a smaller fraction of links
are removed (Fig. 1e). The findings above are consistent with previous work5, 7, 14: proximity
networks are structurally homogeneous with a well-defined average degree, while communica-
tion networks are characterized by heterogeneous degree distributions19, 26. In summary, physical
proximity networks—which approximate the actual paths supporting the spreading of infectious
diseases—and communication networks are fundamentally different both in a structural and dy-
namical sense, e.g., how infectious diseases spread through these networks.
6
full-range proximity
short-range proximity
Facebook
call
a
mon tue wed thu fri sat sun
0
0.4
0.8
time
〈k〉
/
〈k〉
m
ax
b
0 100 200 300 4000
0.01
0.02
k
P(
k) 0 200 4000
0.5
1
k
1-
F(
k)
c
0 5 10 15 20 250
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
k
P(
k)
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
k
1-
F(
k)
d
100 101 102 103 104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
da
y
w
ee
k
m
on
th
t [hours]
S/
GC
0.25 ln t
0.36 ln t
e
0.01 0.1 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1− fedge
GC
Figure 1 Characteristics of the contact and communication networks. Properties of the
four networks aggregated over a week: person-to-person networks (red: full-range, yellow: short-
range), Facebook (blue) and call (green) networks. For three specific times of the week, 4-hour
snapshots are shown. The last column shows the graphs aggregated over the complete period
of the analysis. a) Snapshots of the three networks aggregated over 4 hours periods: Time se-
ries display the corresponding dynamics of average degrees. Throughout the paper, information
extracted from the communication networks (blue and green) is applied for intervention during an
epidemic taking place on the person-to-person networks (red and yellow). b) Degree distribution
of the proximity networks. Inset shows the corresponding cumulative distribution. c) Degree distri-
bution of the communication networks. Inset shows the corrensponding cumulative distribution. d)
Fraction of the giant component (S), i.e., the largest connected component, reached in an invasive
percolation process with percolation probability equal to 1. For each temporal network, curves
show the size of the percolation cluster relative to the giant component, the black lines are guid-
ance for the slopes. All curves are averaged over 1000 random realizations of time and location.
7
e) Robustness of the aggregated networks against link removal. Giant component is shown after
removing fedge fraction of the strongest links. Dashed lines indicate the percolation threshold of
the corresponding random network with the same average number of first and second neighbors.
Below we explore how communication networks can be used for targeted intervention de-
signed to observe and limit disease spread in person-to-person proximity networks. Targets for
epidemic monitoring and vaccination are selected based on closeness centrality in the aggregated
communication networks, i.e., the average distance of a node to all other nodes. Closeness cen-
trality is chosen because this measure provides the best performance on our dataset. We are in-
terested in the dynamics of a single epidemic event, therefore we focus on epidemics without an
endemic state. We evaluate the efficacy of the counter-measures focusing on specific target groups
by measuring the relative outbreak size during Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) epidemics
simulated on both the short and full-range proximity networks. Epidemic parameters are cho-
sen to be consistent with expected infectious periods (3-4 days) and basic reproduction number
(2 < R0 < 3) of real-world infectious diseases such as influenza27; for details see Methods and
the Supplementary Information. Communication network target groups are compared to random
control and colocation target groups. In random selection, a number of individuals are chosen
randomly from the population, providing a lower bound for intervention performance; conversely
colocation target groups include individuals with highest fraction of time spent in proximity of
others. Colocation-based target groups rely on full knowledge of the person-to-person proximity
network topology, and while not strictly optimal, as they do not consider temporal dynamics, they
establish an approximate upper bound for intervention performance4.
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In targeted monitoring, the objective is to select a small fraction of the population that is
expected to become infected at an earlier stage and with a higher probability than the popula-
tion average. In the monitoring scenario no vaccination is applied. Figure 2a depicts the median
infection time restricted to the social target groups (i.e., individuals selected based on closeness
centrality in digital communication network) compared to randomly selected and colocation-based
groups. As a measure of performance, we use corrected time of infection, calculated as the av-
erage time the node is infected, normalized by the probability of infection across many epidemic
realizations4. As expected, colocation-based groups display a significant lead time, a shift in the
expected time of infection compared to the population average, showing a peak in the fraction in-
fected before the epidemic peaks in the population4, 5. We find that individuals selected using only
communication channels also show improved lead times (24% and 18% compared to population
average, corresponding to 3 and 2 days) for both short- and long-range networks–only 14% and
19% worse than the optimal (but logistically infeasible) colocation strategy, respectively.
The aim of vaccination is to decrease outbreak size by decreasing the number of links be-
tween individuals in a population, across which the disease may be transmitted. Therefore, the
goal of an optimized targeted vaccination is to choose individuals with the greatest likelihood of
infecting the largest number of their network neighbors. Specifically, a good candidate for im-
munization should be highly exposed to the disease and simultaneously exhibit high potential to
transmit the infection. To assess the efficacy of vaccination based on the digital communication
networks (social vaccination), we measure the relative epidemic outbreak size in the presence of
immunized target group; that is, the total number of infections (I∞) divided by the initial number
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of susceptible (S0): irel = I∞/S0, excluding the vaccinated subpopulation from the calculation,
and thus measuring only the network effect. In Figure 2b, the median relative outbreak sizes are
plotted against the fraction of the population immunized. Using complete information available
in the person-to-person network (the hypothetical colocation strategy), it is possible to reduce the
outbreak size by more than 80% after the immunization of 20% and 27% of the network in short-
and full-range transmission respectively, effectively containing the outbreak.
In contrast to the general relationship just described between outbreak parameters and mon-
itoring strategy based on proximity, the efficacy of social vaccination strongly depends on the
nature of pathogen transmission, specifically its range. For diseases spreading via short-range
interactions, Facebook and CDR based strategies are effective and outperform random immuniza-
tion even for small target groups, approaching the performance of the colocation strategy once
more than 20% of the population has been vaccinated. If the disease transmission occurs on the
full-range person-to-person network, however, communication networks do not significantly out-
perform random vaccination. This effect is more pronounced in the small target group size regime
(less than 20% of the population). Figure 2b reveals an inherent difference between the fraction
of immunized individuals needed to reach the same reduction of outbreak size in the short and
full-range networks, respectively. The effect of vaccination is generally weaker in the highly con-
nected full-range network. To account for this difference, insets show the difference of outbreak
size between communication network target groups and optimal groups for the same group sizes
(∆i) as a function of outbreak size during optimal vaccination. The separation of curves indicates
the difference in vaccination performance beyond the difference due to network connectedness. At
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low levels of immunization (fv < 0.1, subplots (i) and (iv) in Fig. 2b), the effect of vaccination is
low, due to the high density of edges in both person-to-person proximity networks. At high levels
of immunization (Fig. 2b subplots (iii) and (vi)), with more than half of the population vaccinated,
the digital communication network target groups contain the majority of socially active individuals,
resulting in the social vaccination reaching the optimal strategy also for full-range transmission. In
the intermediate range (0.1 < fv < 0.5, subplots (ii) and (v) in Fig. 2b), communication network
vaccination is significantly more effective and approaches optimal for the short-range transmission.
The intuitive reason behind this difference between the short and full-range networks is that the
structure of the full-range proximity network is strongly influenced by many random encounters,
not captured by the social networks (see Supporting Information for full details).
The performance of social monitoring and vaccination is robust with respect to different
centralities used for selection of the target groups (degree, k-coreness, betweenness) and varia-
tion in how communication channels are constructed. See Supporting Information for full details
regarding the robustness of the results.
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Figure 2 Monitoring and vaccination efficiency of target groups. a) Median corrected infec-
tion times among members of the social target groups compared to random (grey) and optimal
(purple) groups in the absence of vaccination. Corrected infection time is the average infection
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time normalized by the probability of infection for each individual. Results are based on 10 000
simulations. In case of random target groups, curves show the median of average infection times
over 1000 random groups, and error bands denote lower and upper quartiles of the averages.
b) Relative outbreak sizes (total number of infected divided by the initial number of susceptible)
at different levels of immunization based on the social channels during short-range (top) and full-
range (bottom) transmission. All curves show the median of 1000 simulations with minimum out-
break sizes of 5% among the initial susceptible. For three target group sizes (10, 30 and 50), the
corresponding outbreak size distributions p(i) are also shown. Insets show the difference ∆i of
outbreak sizes between social vaccination and optimal, as a function of optimal outbreak size, i.
Each inset shows all four comparisons, curves corresponding to the type of transmission in main
plot (short or full-range) are highlighted.
Practical targeted monitoring and vaccination, regardless of the target selection strategy, re-
quires the social system to be stable, so that targets can be identified before an outbreak takes
place. To analyze the tradeoff between performance of targeted intervention and the time gap
between identification and intervention, we fix the period that forms the basis of our target indi-
vidual selection (February, index month) and calculate monitoring and immunization performance
for epidemic outbreaks in subsequent months (March, April and May, outbreak months), as shown
in Figure 3. The performance of strategies based on the index month is compared to random and
two types of colocation strategies: colocation-based on proximity in the index month and that
of the outbreak month. Communication network target groups show significantly lower infection
time relative to random monitoring, although target groups based on the index month do not per-
form as well as the optimal groups calculated in the outbreak months (Figure 3a) due to the small
changes in the social structure of the population. Immunizing members of the index month target
groups outperforms random vaccination in all three outbreak months, as seen in Figure 3b. Fur-
ther, relative outbreak size during social vaccination approaches those corresponding to the index
13
month colocation strategy. These results suggest that communication networks enable us to locate
individuals who consistently play a central role in epidemic outbreaks.
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Figure 3 Robustness of social target group effectiveness. a) Median infection time as a
measure for monitoring effectiveness in consecutive months: social (green and blue for call and
Facebook based communication groups), optimal based on the index month of February (purple),
random (grey) and optimal based on the monthly data (black line). Error bars on the random
monitor groups correspond to lower and upper quartiles. b) Performance of social vaccination
based on the index month applied in consecutive months. Communication network based vacci-
nation is compared against random (grey), optimal for the index month (purple) and optimal for the
corresponding month (dashed dashed). Curves represent median values over 1000 simulations.
In case of epidemic outbreaks, person-to-person proximity contacts provide the paths for
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many infectious diseases to spread, but measuring these contacts in vivo during an epidemic event
is not feasible using current technology. In this paper, we have shown that the structure of digital
communication networks does indeed allow us to identify candidates for targeted epidemic moni-
toring and vaccination. Monitoring based on communication networks outperforms random target
groups and approaches the optimal strategy. The performance of targeted vaccination based on
communication network structure, however, is strongly affected by the nature of pathogen trans-
mission, displaying high efficacy in case of short-range transmission, but is significantly less ap-
plicable when an infection spreads via long-range contacts. This result arises from the inherent
structure of short-range physical contacts: close contacts in the person-to-person network fre-
quently correspond to social ties and therefore communication networks contain more relevant
information about the structure of the short-range network. These findings suggest that, when
considering real-world diseases, online social networks and CDR data can serve as a valuable re-
source for epidemic intervention. Regarding one of the most basic differences between the above
transmission types (their physical range of infection) immunization strategies may benefit from
digital communication networks in case of droplet diseases, but will have limited utility during
airborne infections, as we expect real-world airborne networks to have even more connections be-
tween socially not connected individuals than the long-range network examined here due to the
characteristics of airborne diseases (the ability to suspend in rooms, transmission via touches, etc).
Below, we discuss and address the potential shortcomings of the dataset as well as the epidemic
model used in the paper.
Spreading mechanism—It is important to acknowledge that our model of epidemic processes
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on the person-to-person proximity networks is a strong simplification of the underlying biological
processes. The detailed transmission of droplet and airborne diseases is not fully captured by re-
ciprocal Bluetooth measurements, e.g., transmission of biological pathogens is not merely charac-
terized by the distance but is also affected by many other environmental characteristics and individ-
ual behavior. Droplet transmission requires individuals to face each other in close proximity20, 28,
while airborne pathogens can stay suspended in the air or settle on surfaces, significantly increas-
ing opportunity for infection28. However, these characteristics amplify the differences between the
person-to-person networks by effectively removing superfluous links from the short-range network
and adding additional noise to the long-range network. Thus, the efficacy of using digital commu-
nication channels in targeted monitoring and vaccination can be expected to be even higher for true
droplet network and closer to random for airborne transmission.
Optimal strategies—Our strategy is based on basic network topology measures (centrali-
ties), and presumably more sophisticated strategies can be constructed in order to achieve higher
performance in much larger populations. Our results, which suggest that social monitoring and
vaccination are effective strategies to observe and limit epidemic outbreaks, are robust in the face
of changes in the exact method of target selection (i.e., exact measure of centrality in the contact
or communication networks), see Supporting Information for details.
Epidemic modeling—The participants in the study represent a single specific population, a
fact known to result in an underestimation of epidemic risk29. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
our results rely solely on the comparisons within the same population, and the structural differences
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are restricted to that of connectivity. In order to isolate the key mechanisms, we used a highly
simplified model, the SIR dynamics, with no vital dynamics (temporal changes in the population
due to births and deaths) or aging (accounting for different age classes of the population). It
is well known that vital dynamics and aging have a strong impact on the spreading process30,
however, in the cohort that forms the basis of the current study, individuals are members of the
same age class and therefore we can neglect vital dynamics. Finally, Bluetooth signals are able to
pass through walls which introduces non-physical contacts and unrealistic spreading events in the
dataset, however, the fraction of links that can be potentially associated to these cases is negligible.
In this paper, we have taken a first step towards investigating how knowledge of digital com-
munication network structure of a population can be used to identify target groups for efficient
targeted monitoring and vaccination. Our most notable finding is that, in our modeling frame-
work, relatively subtle differences in the structure of transmission mechanisms, formulated here as
a dichotomous choice between droplet-like and airborne routes, may have a profound impact on
final epidemic size when using communication networks as a basis for targeted vaccination. These
result may also have important practical implications for the distribution of non-vaccine epidemic
countermeasures in these settings. Since digital communication data of the types modeled here
may allow for early detection and containment of infectious outbreaks in densely-connected popu-
lations (i.e., in schools, universities, workplaces, and neighborhoods), our work supports increased
collaboration between practitioners in public health and operators of social networks and telecoms.
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Methods
Data collection. Proximity, call detail records (CDRs), and Facebook feed data was recorded
during the Copenhagen Network Study between 2012 and 201418. During the experiment, 1 000
Nexus smartphones with pre-installed data collector application were handed out to students at the
Danish Technical University (DTU) and data on multiple channels was recorded: location, WiFi
scans, Facebook feed, call detail records, Bluetooth scans with a temporal resolution of at least 5
min. Students used the devices as their phones, resulting in a high coverage ratio of the data during
the period of the experiment; their anonymized data was uploaded to the servers at DTU. Results
reported in this paper correspond to the period of February 2014. Here we consider data from the
participants with at least 60% of data quality in the period of interest (based on proximity data),
resulting in 532 individuals (proximity data was time-binned in 5 minutes bins, and users having
Bluetooth signal or appearing in a Bluetooth scan list at least 60% of the total time bins were
considered). See Supplementary Information for the details of data collection and data filtering.
Ethical statement. Prior to the experiment, all participating students were informed on the
data collection method and the research goals. Data collection, anonymization, and storage were
approved by the Danish Data Protection Agency, and comply with both local and EU regulations.
Contact and communication channels. Bluetooth scan lists are used to construct temporal
proximity networks in two different ways: raw scan list data provides all interactions in a long-
range (up to 10− 15 m) that are the basis for the full-range disease spread. By restricting contacts
to signal strengths of RSSI > −75 dBm, close-contact networks (up to 1 m) can be obtained23. It
18
should be noted that the above threshold is highly conservative in order to reduce the likelihood
for observing long-range contacts, therefore the usual distance corresponding to the short-range
network is below 1 m. In the case of digital communication networks, both CDR and Facebook
feed data were aggregated over the period of interest, resulting in undirected and weighted static
graphs, where weights correspond to the number of interactions between participants.
Epidemiological model. Dynamics of the close- and long-range diseases is simulated using
the SIR model. According to the model, all individuals are susceptible with the exception of a
small number of index cases (1% in our simulations). Whenever an infected is in contact with
a susceptible, the latter becomes infected with probability β, and at each time step each infected
becomes recovered with probability γ, these parameters are adjusted to be consistent with real-
world infections. The probability of infection per contact event and expected infectious period
at each time step are βfull = 0.002, T fullinf = 3 days and β
short = 0.01, T shortinf = 4 days for the
full- and short-range proximity, respectively. Considering the average degree in a time step, i.e.,
〈k〉 = 1N (t)
∫ ti+∆t
ti
〈k〉(t′)dt′, (where N (t) denotes the number of time steps), the above infection
probabilities correspond to real physical rates of infection of βfullphysical = 0.717 day
−1 and βshortphysical =
0.591 day−1, and result in the basic reproduction numbers of Rfull0 = 2.151 and R
short
0 = 2.364,
which is within the range of R0 for influenza11. When individuals become infected, they recover
with a probability that corresponds in the aforementioned average infectious times. More details on
the parameter adjustment, analysis and the behavior of SIR dynamics on the presented proximity
networks are presented in the Supplementary Information.
Throughout the paper, we applied several network theoretical measures that are well-defined
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in an undirected graph. Structure of a static aggregated network can be described by three basic
network descriptors: the average number of contacts (average degree); average fraction of con-
nected neighbors (average clustering coefficient); or the average number of steps between all pairs
of nodes (average path length). Moreover, target groups of size n are obtained from the digital so-
cial networks by ranking individuals in the aggregated graphs by their closeness centrality, defined
by:
C(i)c =
N − 1∑
j 6=i dij
, (1)
where N is the number of nodes in the graph and dij denotes the geodesic distance between nodes
i and j, i.e., the lowest number of steps to reach node j from node i. If the graph is not connected,
it is defined to be dij = N , which is always larger than the geodesic distance between any pairs
of nodes. After ranking the individuals according to Cc, we select the ones with the n highest
centrality. In case of colocation based target groups, individuals are ranked based on their total
time spent in the proximity of others, that is:
wi =
∑
j,t
γijt, (2)
where γijt = 1 if participants i and j have been in close proximity at time t, and zero otherwise.
Ranking all members by their weight wi, we select the ones with the largest value to include in the
target groups, following the strategy of Smieszek and Salathe´4. Strategies based on other centrality
measures as well as the details of the selection are discussed in more details in the Supplementary
20
Information.
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Network E 〈k〉 C `
Full-range proximity 69 055 259.6 0.644 1.53
Short-range proximity 20 690 77.78 0.356 1.91
Facebook 1 261 4.741 0.150 3.87
Call 354 1.331 0.102 7.03
Table 1: Structural properties of the static aggregated physical proximity and social net-
works: number of diads (E), average degree (〈k〉), average clustering coefficient (C) and
average path length (`). For definitions, see Methods.
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S1 The Dataset
We consider data collected in the Copenhagen Networks Study, spanning years between 2013 and
2015. The data has been collected from a densely-connected freshman population of approximately
1 000 students at a large European university (Technical University of Denmark) and contains high-
resolution traces including close-proximity interactions, telecommunication, online social networks,
and geographical location. Here, densely-connected refers to the high frequency of physical prox-
imity contacts as well as online communication between the individuals. Majority of the data has
been collected with custom-built application installed on smartphones provided to the participants
(Google Nexus 4). Full details of the study can be found in Ref. [1].
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Network Vactive Edynamic Estatic 〈k〉dynamic 〈k〉static
Full-range proximity 532 2 670 547 69 055 1.245 259.6
Short-range proximity 518 428 481 20 690 0.200 77.78
Facebook 410 3 321 1 261 0.007 4.741
Call 345 2 134 354 0.004 1.331
Table 1: Basic statistics of the physical proximity and social networks: active individuals (Vactive),
those having at least one link; total number of temporal links (Edynamic); number of diads or
static links (Estatic); dynamic degree (〈k〉dynamic), that is the average degree for single time bins,
averaged over all time bins; static degree (〈k〉static). Average degrees are calculated using the total
population size, i.e., Vtotal = 532.
In this manuscript we select individuals with a data quality of at least 60% during period we
focus on (February 2014), defined by the time coverage of the Bluetooth scans. Data quality is cal-
culated by binning all Bluetooth scans (that are used for inferring physical proximity interactions)
and removing participants that have appeared in scans in less than 60% of the total bins (i.e.,
4838 out of 8064 time bins). This results in a population of 532 individuals. Using Bluetooth, call
detail records (CDRs), and Facebook feed data, we construct four distinct networks of interactions
between the selected individuals.
S1.1 Network creation
Physical proximity networks are built using Bluetooth scans between devices. Each time the device
ID of participant i is listed in a Bluetooth scan of the device of participant j at time t, there is a
link γijt = s between the corresponding participants, where s denotes the received signal strength
indicator (RSSI). From the raw counts, we build temporally-binned contacts with bin size of 5
minutes, such that if there is any observation in the n-th time bin, we add a link. As we do not
expect false positives in a Bluetooth scan, all edges are undirected even if they are observed in
only one direction. We also extend local star-like graphs to cliques, to avoid missing links in case
of a single (or very few) devices reporting data in particular time bin. Such pre-processing results
in physical proximity network capturing interactions at the distance of 10 − 15 meters, which we
denote full-range network. The network is described by a binary-valued adjacency matrix Ai×j×t
with aijt = 1 when interaction is present and aijt = 0 otherwise. We also create short-range
network by thresholding the links based on their RSSI values, i.e., we restrict the links only to
those for which γijt > s0 with s0 = −75 dB. It has been shown that this value corresponds to
a distance up to approximately 1m [2, 3]. Thus, we create two types of proximity networks, one
with full-range interactions and one with only very close proximity events. This constraint on the
signal strength results in a more sparse and tree-like network (18% of the original interactions are
present after thresholding).
Digital social networks, corresponding to social behavior and social ties, are based on calls and
Facebook activity. Each call between two individuals results in a corresponding link in the call
network, and every interaction on Facebook creates a link in the functional Facebook network
(interactions include comments, tags, messages, mentions, posts, etc). Here we do not use the
temporal information in the social networks, i.e., we use networks as aggregated over the month
of interest. We also do not consider directionality of calls nor directionality or type of Facebook
interactions. It is also possible to build other types of networks by including text messages in
addition to calls metadata or using the static friendship links between users (for structural Facebook
graph). However, as we show in the sections Monitoring and Vaccination, these approaches do not
result in significant differences in social monitoring and vaccination. Finally, we summarize the
basic properties of the four networks of the study in Table 1.
S1.2 Limitations of physical proximity contacts
As Bluetooth signals can pass through walls, some fraction of the contact networks built from the
Bluetooth scans are expected to be false contacts, as they are not able to transmit real physical
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Figure 1: Distribution of Bluetooth based proximity contacts Total temporal coverage of
proximity links versus their average RSSI, that is, the signal strength. Above the horizontal line
are the links that describe contacts of frequent periods with a total length of more than 7 × 28
hours. To the left from the vertical lines lie the links that correspond to the short-range interactions
(RSSI > −75 dB).
diseases. To address this problem, we consider the signal strength (RSSI) of the links: it’s feasible
to assume that links passing through walls have a vanishing strength irrespective of the actual
distance. Therefore, in the short-range network we don’t expect fake contacts as it includes only
links with a certain high signal strength. In case of full-range network, weak links are more
common. However, from the simulation perspective those weak links have a relatively high impact
on the spread that are also frequently re-appearing, i.e., signals corresponding to dorm walls. To
investigate these links, in Fig. 1 we plot the total time coverage of the links versus their average
signal strength. Signals crossing dormitory walls are located in the upper-left corner, i.e., the
frequent weak links, however, as the figure shows, these links are rare and they cover a negligible
fraction of the total temporal links.
Furthermore, the majority of infections take place during lunch breaks, classes and social events
where individuals are located in the same closed area.
S1.3 Target group selection
For the epidemic monitoring and vaccination, we construct target groups based on different types
of ranking: random, colocation, and social.
In case of random target groups, for a given group size n, we pick n participants from the
population at random, without using any auxiliary information.
For colocation groups, we consider the aggregated weight of individuals in the proximity net-
works. For each participant we calculate wi =
∑
j,t aijt, that is, the total time (expressed in
5-minute bins) spent in the proximity of others. Note that in this case, each temporal link is
considered separately, thus someone spending a given amount of time in a large group has higher
weight than that of spending the same time in a small group. After ranking individuals by their
weight, we select the top n individuals from the population as our target group. As shown in
Ref. [4], in case of epidemic monitoring the colocation-based target group performs close to the
optimal strategy achieved with a greedy algorithm. Although during vaccination the colocation-
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based group is not strictly optimal considering that no temporal information is utilized, it provides
a reasonable upper bound of the vaccination performance with access to full information about
close-proximity interactions. Keeping the above in mind, we refer to the colocation strategy as
optimal.
Social target groups are based purely on information extracted from the social networks, with
the assumption that those networks describe, at a fundamental level, social structure of the pop-
ulation. In order to assess the social role and importance of an individual, we calculate their
centrality in the aggregated social networks, rank the population by the centrality, and pick the
n most central individuals. The results in the manuscript are reported with closeness centrality,
however, the exact centrality used does not affect the findings qualitatively. Similarly, even if link
weights (i.e., the number of contacts between individuals) are considered, the corresponding results
do not change and we do not observe significant gain in performance, suggesting that the extent
of the ego-network is more relevant than the strength of the specific links.
For some group sizes the ranking of the individuals does not result in distinct ranks, i.e., when
selecting top n participants is not unambiguous. In these cases we consider 10 target groups by
randomly selecting the lowest rank members and average all results over the 10 samples. More
precisely, let us assume we can select n − k individuals with distinct rank and the remaining k
individuals share the same rank with m− k others (in other words, the ones with the lowest rank
in the target groups can be selected from among m participants). Then we pick 10 different groups
with the lowest k members being sampled uniformly from the m ones sharing the same rank,
perform the same analysis and average the results over the groups.
S1.4 Testing for quality bias
We perform a quality check on the data to ensure that the reported results are not simply a
consequence of quality bias. We test if individuals with high-quality data (those having a high
temporal coverage in Bluetooth scans) are also the ones that have many calls or increased activity
on Facebook. As Bluetooth scanning happens passively on the phones and we consider data
quality based on the number of scans (regardless whether they discovered other participants of the
study or not), we expect no correlation between how socially active the participants are and their
data quality. We plot call and Facebook event counts for each user versus their corresponding
coverage of Bluetooth data, as shown in Fig. 2. For the comparison, we plot data calculated over
a complete year and show both total and internal communications of participants. (for better
visibility, we omitted the top < 10 largely deviating data points). Correlations are low and in
many cases are not significant: r(w, ccall) = −0.0343(0.4286), r(w, ccall total) = 0.2012(0.0000),
r(w, cFacebook) = 0.0009(0.9833), r(w, cFacebook total) = −0.0282(0.5149). We report Spearman
correlations, not assuming linear relation between the intensity of the two activities (social and
proximity), numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding p-values. The results indicate
that the image of social activity we get about the population is not driven by data quality variation.
Note that the manuscript, we base our results only on internal phone calls.
As for the social channels, the likelihood of missing data in the Facebook channel is minimal
as the feed of each user has been crawled every 24 hours, providing a high level of redundancy for
data quality. We consider the quality of the call data instead. To investigate whether we perceive
some students that are highly connected in the call network merely due to the quality of recording
their events better than others’, we compare the calling behavior pattern of all participants in the
month of interest (February 2014) to their yearly behavior. Figure 3 shows the individual deviations
from their yearly average in February compared to the call intensity in the index month, i.e., the
standard score of monthly calls: (n0i − ni)/σ(ni) versus n0i , where n0i is the number of calls in the
considered month, ni and σ(ni) are the mean and standard deviation in the other months. As
seen from the plot, high number of calls does not correlate with the deviation from the individual
average. Furthermore, as centrality values (color of the dots) indicate, high social centrality is
not driven by count number nor deviation from the yearly behavior. This indicates that although
we may expect certain amount of noise in the data, relevant measures on the population are not
biased.
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Figure 2: Social activity versus data quality in the proximity layer Call and Facebook
activity intensity compared to the coverage seen by the Bluetooth scans for each participant in
the current study: (top) total number of calls and Facebook events involving the given partic-
ipant, (bottom) internal communication events, i.e., only between individuals considered in the
simulations. Social network counts are normalized by the largest data point shown.
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Figure 3: Call activity deviations versus call counts Standard score of monthly number of
calls for each participant considered in the current study compared to their rank based on the
actual number of calls in the index month (February, 2014). Color denotes the closeness centrality
of the individuals in the aggregated network of calls.
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S2 Model
S2.1 SIR model
For simulation of epidemic outbreaks, we use a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model taking
place on the network of physical interactions of the individuals. The SIR model assumes that the
entire population—except for the index cases—is initially susceptible. Whenever a susceptible indi-
vidual has contact to an infected one, the susceptible individual becomes infected with probability
β. Infected individuals recover after an average infectious period Tinf which is modeled in this
study by a probability γ to recover at any time. Recovered individuals can not be re-infected. We
use the temporal proximity networks obtained from the Bluetooth scans as the contact network.
In all simulations, the size of the index (initially infected) group is 5 (approximately 1% of the
population).
S2.2 Transmission types
We model two different types of disease transmission: full-range and short-range infections, by mod-
ifying the structural properties of the underlying networks as introduced in the previous section.
In the full-range transmission (up to 10-15 meters) we loosely approximate spreading of airborne
diseases (e.g. measles) [3]. Short-range transmission (approximately up to 1 meter) corresponds
roughly to droplet diseases (e.g. influenza). While the proximity networks do not correspond to
disease transmission exactly, they have been considered in the literature a telling approximation
of the potential spreading paths [4, 5, 6, 3].
S2.3 Parameter selection
The applied epidemiological model has two parameters: the probability of infection β and the
probability of recovery γ. Given the temporal resolution (∆t = 1/288day) and temporal aver-
age degree (〈k〉 = 1N (t)
∫ ti+∆t
ti
〈k〉(t′)dt′, N (t) denoting the number of time bins), the simulation
probabilities correspond to real physical rates in the following way. The rate of infection is given
by
βphysical =
〈k〉β
∆t
, (1)
whereas the expected infectious period is
Tinf =
∆t
γ
. (2)
Based on the physical rates the basic reproduction number is R0 = βphysicalTinf .
Before investigating epidemic surveillance and immunization, we have to set infection probabil-
ity and infectious time by bearing two aspects in mind: first, we intend to have an infectious time
in the order of magnitude of days and second, to measure changes in outbreak sizes accurately we
aim for an outbreak that lies near the boundary of the epidemic threshold: a disease that does
not extinct but it does not result in the full infection of the population either. Figure 4 shows the
relative outbreak size (irel, the total number of infected divided by the population size) at different
values of the parameters during airborne and droplet diseases.
Note that parameter values were probed on a logarithmic scale (we tested parameter values of
10n, 2 · 10n and 5 · 10n for various exponents n) and therefore the size of the tiles in the figure
is not uniform. Based on the outbreak size landscape, the following parameters were chosen for
the airborne and droplet networks (marked by the white circles): βfull = 0.002, T fullinf = 3 days and
βshort = 0.01, T shortinf = 4 days, resulting in typical outbreak sizes of i
full
rel = 0.727 and i
short
rel = 0.634.
Table 2 summarizes the simulation parameters and related physical rates for the two proximity
networks.
As we are interested only in the actual outbreak size (instead of the probability of outbreak or
extinction), in all cases we accept only those simulations with a relative outbreak size of at least 5%,
which results in a corresponding saturation value of the relative outbreak size in our vaccination
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Figure 4: Outbreak size as the function of the various paremters. Absolute size of the
outbreak (total number of infections normalized by the population size) at different values of the
contact rate (β) and average infectious period (Tinf). White circles show the position of the actual
values that were used for the two transmission types. Each tile corresponds to the median outbreak
size of 100 SIR simulations.
Network 〈k〉 β γ βphysical Tinf R0
Full-range 1.245 0.002 11.57 · 10−4 0.717 day−1 3 day 2.151
Short-range 0.200 0.01 8.68 · 10−4 0.591 day−1 4 day 2.364
Table 2: Simulation parameters and the corresponding physical quantities: average temporal degree
(〈k〉), probability of infection for a single infected-susceptible contact (β), physical rate of infection
(βphysical), probability of recovery for a single time step (γ), expected infectious period (Tinf) and
the basic reproduction number (R0).
curves. As for the monitoring, to obtain a larger ensemble for the statistics, the threshold of
relative outbreak size is 20%, however, the results are robust against the choice of threshold.
S2.4 Epidemic dynamics
Here we provide a quick overview of the actual dynamics of the epidemics and how it is realized
in the various monitoring and vaccination scenarios. For the two cases of preventive strategies,
we plot the fraction of infected in Fig. 5 in time. During epidemic surveillance, we consider a
non-vaccinated scenario and measure the corresponding statistics inside the target group, which
is shown in Fig. 5a. As the curves show, for both transmission types, the prevalence peaks at
an earlier stage in social target groups compared to the population average. Furthermore, in
case of the short-range network, the group dynamics is almost identical to that of the optimal
group. The cumulative curves also indicate significant differences (Fig. 5a inset). In the presence
of vaccination (Fig. 5b), we immunize those in the target group and plot the fraction of infected in
the total population. For better comparison, we use a larger target group size (120 individuals) for
the full-range network (for short-range, a group of 50 participants is shown), still we can observe
large differences between the two cases of transmission types. Although social vaccination displays
pronounced effects compared to the unvaccinated and the random vaccination cases, the slow-down
in the dynamics and the the shrink of the peak is more emphasized during short-range interactions,
also approaching the results of immunizing the optimal target group more. Again, the above effect
is more visible in the integrated number of infected as shown in the inset of Fig. 5b.
S3 Monitoring
In epidemic surveillance candidates in effective target groups are preferred to be in the high-risk
subset of the population and preferably are infected early in the outbreak. This way, status of
target individuals can be used to notice epidemic outbreak before it infects a high fraction of the
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Figure 5: Typical dynamics of the outbreak. a) Prevalence of the disease inside the monitor
group compared to random target groups (that shows the same dynamics as the population aver-
age). For each curve, monitor groups include the 30 individuals with the highest rank according to
the given strategy. a) Prevalence measured in the total population during vaccination. Each curve
represents the dynamics of the infection when the corresponding target groups are immunized,
compared to the unvaccinated case and also to randomly selected target groups. Size of the target
groups is 120 for full-range and 50 for short-range transmission. In both panels, insets show the
cumulative fraction of infected. All curves are the median over 1000 simulations.
population and may help in forecasting outbreak statistics. Therefore, the good target group is
small compared to the population (so that monitoring is feasible and requires a lower level of
resource allocation) and has high infection probability and low infection time. Here we consider
various target group sizes and, in order to obtain a large number of samples for the statistics,
we only consider outbreaks above 20% of relative outbreak size. In each case, we measure two
quantities for target individuals related to epidemic surveillance. First we calculate the probability
of infection—the fraction of simulations in which an individual becomes infected, provided that
they are not part of the index group:
Pinf(i) = Ninf(i)
N(i)
, (3)
where N(i) is the number of simulations in which individual i was not an index case and Ninf(i)
is the number of simulations in which individual i was infected during the outbreak. We also
measure a corrected infection time that accounts for the level of exposure of an individual to the
disease—the average time of their infection, divided by the probability of infection:
τinf(i) =
tinf(i)
Pinf(i) . (4)
where tinf(i) is the average time of getting the infection for individual i. In case of individuals who
are never infected, the total duration of the outbreak is considered.
S3.1 Social monitoring
Figure 6 shows the infection probability and infection time for the four types of target groups dur-
ing full- and short-range infection outbreaks. In both transmission types, social monitor groups
outperform random groups in the probability of infection, with performance close to optimal (colo-
cation) groups, indicating that socially central individuals are indeed members of the high-risk
subpopulation, irrespective of the infection range. Infection times in these groups are significantly
lower compared to the population average, displaying temporal gain of 1.5 - 4 days, translating to
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Figure 6: Monitoring performance of social target groups Median infection probability
(left) and median infection time (right) of social target groups of different size, compared to the
population average (random, grey) and optimal (purple) groups. Each curve is the result of 104
simulations with a minimum relative outbreak size of 20% in an unvaccinated population. Curves
corresponding to the random groups show the median over 100 random realizations, error bars
denote lower and upper quartiles of the samples.
leading times of 15-25% compared to the population mean, depending on the transmission type
and group size.
Social networks contain sufficient information about the population to effectively monitor the
population in case of an epidemic, and various layers of social interaction (calls, text messages,
Facebook events) show similar performance in inferring good candidates for monitoring. Further-
more, as long as the selection of target individuals is based on a centrality that grasps the global
structure of the corresponding networks, the details of the method is less relevant. These obser-
vations are summarized in Fig. 7, where we compare various centralities as well as social network
channels. Comparison of different centralities considered in the call-based network results in similar
performance (with the exception of the raw count-based ranking), and we also notice that closeness
centrality shows the best performance, although only marginally better than other strategies.
In addition to various centrality measures, we also consider social sensors strategy [7, 8, 9].
We simulate friendship based target groups from the phone network (calls and text messages) in
the following way. First, we consider the three most frequent contacts for each individual and
denote them as friends. Based on these top-contact lists, we rank the participants according to the
number of times they appear on the friends list. As Fig. 7b shows, the resulting target groups have
similar performance as the centrality-based ones. Finally, if additional or other channels as text
messages or structural Facebook connections are considered, the monitoring performance does not
change significantly (Fig. 7c-d).
S3.2 Effect of network structure
Since monitoring does not alter the structure of the network but probes the outbreaks dynamics
using small number of individuals, we can simplify the question of finding good candidates to pos-
sible correlations between network properties and monitoring efficiency, e.g., infection probability.
We remove various correlations from the proximity networks, and plot infection probability versus
the weight of individuals in the network. Results are shown in Fig. 8 for both full- and short-range
proximity networks. We apply three types of correlation removal:
Temporal We remove all circadian rhythm effects and re-distribute links homogeneously in
time, keeping both aggregated degree-distribution and degree-correlations. We simply re-
assign time stamps so that their distribution became uniform in time. Individual weights are
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Figure 7: Different monitoring strategies. Monitoring power of target groups selected by
various methods and using different channels: (a) testing centrality measures based on the call
network, dashed lines denote weighted measures; (b) social sensors estimated from the call + text
messages network as well as from the short-range proximity network, dashed lines correspond to
social sensors estimated from the short-range proximity network; (c) networks constructed from
calls only compared to calles + text messages; (d) functional Facebook network (based on user
activity) compared to structural Facebook network (that is, the sole structure of friendships). All
lines are the result of 1000 simulations with a relative outbreak size larger than 20%.
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Figure 8: Structural effects on monitoring performance Infection probability of individuals
versus their corresponding weight in the proximity networks after several correlations are removed:
the original networks (yellow), after temporal correlations are removed (green), after structural
correlations are removed (red) and when all correlations are eliminated (blue). In all cases, the
personal weights are kept fixed as it forms the basis of the curves shown.
kept fixed.
Spatial All degree-correlations are removed, but both circadian rhythm and the static degree-
distributions are kept fixed. This corresponds to a redistribution of temporal links according
to the degree-distributions and temporal edge density. Individual weights remain the same.
Spatio-temporal Both temporal and spatial correlations are removed, together with the ag-
gregated degree-distribution. Only the individual weights are conserved from the original
structure of the networks.
In both short- and full-range networks, removing spatio-temporal correlations also removes the
vast majority of noise from the structure, and results in a clear trend of infection probability as
a function of weight, saturating at some point (Figure 8). The higher level of initial noise in the
original networks seen in the short-range case indicates that structure plays a major role in the
strength of weight-based target groups. Spatial randomization also removes more noise from the
trends, suggesting that the temporal nature of the networks has a smaller effect during epidemic
surveillance. These observations point our that weight is the most relevant property when the sus-
ceptibility of individuals is considered. This is supported by the fact that highly central individuals
in social networks are more likely to have high weight, we find the correlations between social net-
work centralities and physical proximity networks to be approximately rSpearman = 0.4. However,
as we have seen, the structural correlation between social networks and proximity networks does
not prove to be sufficient for efficient vaccination, as vaccination corresponds to a fundamentally
different challenge, by effectively removing individuals from the network, thus changing the under-
lying network structure.
S4 Vaccination
S4.1 Social vaccination
In the manuscript we have shown that social vaccination is effective in short-range transmission,
here we explore robustness of the observed performance against various definition of ‘central in-
dividuals’. Several strategies exploiting the structure of social networks have been proposed for
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Figure 9: Effect of various centrality measures and communication channels considered.
Panels show the vaccination performance of target groups based on different centralities and layers,
with a single centrality or channel being highlighted in each panel. In case of different centralities
(left panels), the call network was used as the basis for the analysis. For the different channels (right
panels, with the exception of the bottom panel), we selected individuals based on the closeness
centrality. Bottom right panel shows the results with the social sensors, the simulation of Christakis
et al. social sensor selection method based on the call + text message data among students.
efficient immunization [10, 11, 9]. Figure 9a shows the performance of social vaccination (in short-
range transmission) based on different strategies for determining target individuals. The network
measures in the population are highly correlated and lead to qualitatively similar results, inde-
pendent of whether degree, k-cores, or betweenness centrality are considered. We also examine
different configurations of the social network channels used for social vaccination, adding text
message metadata to call metadata and using the Facebook friendship graph. We find no signifi-
cant difference in the efficacy by using these different views, indicating that the epidemiologically
relevant individuals can be robustly identified based on the digital social networks.
To overcome the difficulty of collecting a complete network of interactions for targeted inter-
ventions, a scheme of social sensors (acquaintance immunization) has been proposed [7, 8, 9]. By
vaccinating friends of randomly selected individuals—as such friends tend to be more central in
the social network—strictly local information can be used (majority of the above measures rely on
global network information). Here we evaluate the performance of social sensors scheme directly,
choosing three strongest contacts from the call and SMS lists of each individual as a proxy for
naming someone a friend[1]. Individuals nominated as friends most often were then included in
the target groups. We show that social sensors are a useful strategy for selecting individuals using
strictly local information in the network, with the performance close to using full network structure
(Fig. 9a lower right panel).
S4.2 Models of social target groups
To understand the performance of social vaccination, here we provide a qualitative explanation of
the observed vaccination curves. The performance of the social vaccination in the short- and full-
range transmission networks can we be decomposed into the result of two basic mechanisms. For a
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given vaccination size, social networks manage to identify certain fraction of individuals from the
optimal (colocation) group, the the core. Those target individuals not included in the colocation
group (the the periphery) also contribute to the performance and in the case of an effective target
group these individuals also display increased relevance during immunization. To understand the
impact of these two components, we consider three modified models of target groups:
Model A We keep the core fixed and replace the periphery with individuals sampled from
outside the optimal group randomly.
Model B We keep the periphery fixed and replace the core by randomly chosen individuals
from the optimal group.
Model C We keep the periphery fixed and replace the core with the same number of most
connected participants from the optimal group.
Results are shown in Figure 10. The decrease of performance in model A indicates that social
networks are able to locate more appropriate candidates (compared to random) outside of the
optimal group in addition to the optimal ones (Fig. 10a). This observation is more pronounced in
the short-range network (Fig. 10b). In case of the core however, social networks highlight optimal
individuals with the same efficiency as one would obtain by sampling the optimal group randomly,
as indicated by negligible change in performance in model B. Finally, the performance change of
model C compared to the original strategy is higher in the full-range network than that in the
short-range, indicating that this effect is a major driver (together with difference uncovered by
model A) behind the superior performance of the social vaccination in the short-range network.
The difference in the performance due to the contribution of the periphery can be explained
by the structural differences between the proximity networks. Calculating cosine similarity of the
participants’ weighted degree v (the fraction of interactions they have with the rest of the popula-
tion) between digital social and physical proximity networks for all participants θ(vdigital, vphysical),
we show that short-range network displays higher frequency of high similarity values (θ > 0.5)
(Fig. 10c). Digital social networks capture the local structure of the short-range network to a
higher extent than that of the long-range network, which includes a high fraction of incidental
interactions[3]. As a consequence, social networks are able to locate epidemiologically relevant
target individuals outside of the optimal group, as central participants in the social networks are
also exhibit high centrality in the short-range network.
On the other hand, performance change with respect to the core is related to whether the con-
tacts of the vaccinated nodes are internal or external. Vaccinating individuals effectively removes
them from the network along with all of their contacts. Internal links are connecting target indi-
viduals, and so their interactions do not contribute to the improvement in the vaccination. Thus,
even though the total weight of the removed links may be equal in short- and full-range networks,
the actual impact of the removed links can be different if the distribution of internal/external links
differ. Interactions in the short-range network tend to take place between participants socially
more related[3], and we observe that target groups in that network also tend to be more inter-
connected (Fig. 10d). Thus choosing the individuals with the highest level of interactions (weight)
in the short-range network does not lead to pronounced increment in performance, as we remove
individuals from a more interconnected subgraph (compared to the full-range network).
S4.3 Epidemic spread on the social networks
The main aim of the work presented in the manuscript is to find individuals based on their social
network (which is approximated from their digital fingerprint) while probing their impact in case of
an epidemic outbreak that takes place on the physical proximity networks. Our results show that
social and proximity networks are structured in a way that allows for a decreased performance
for vaccination, however, the efficacy of state-of-the-art strategies proposed in the literature is
related to the fact that both finding target individuals and evaluating their impact was performed
on the same network. Figure 11b shows how we would understand the performance of targeted
vaccination if both the selection and the spread of took place on the social networks. As we can
see, if the disease spreads in the same network that is the basis for the target group selection,
degree immunization (that is, one of the most efficient strategy) performs well in both dynamic
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Figure 10: Role of target individuals in social target groups. a) Median relative outbreak
size in three models (see text for their definitions) compared to random (light gray), optimal
(light purple) and the call network (light green). b) Relative differences in the outbreak sizes
of the original and the modified social groups as the function of the outbreak size in the optimal
vaccination, the curves of the corresponding proximity network are highlighted. c) Top: illustration
of the cosine similarity. For each individual, we define their weighted degree as the total fraction of
interactions with all other participants (weighted degrees are normalized to have unit component
sum). For a given proximity network, the cosine similarity between the weighted degrees of the
same individual is calculated, and the distribution of similarities is constructed. Bottom: point-wise
ratio of the probabilities of similarity values in short-range and full-range networks, when compared
to the call (green) and Facebook (blue) graphs. Inset shows the original similarity distributions
for the short-range (yellow) and full-range (red) graphs with the call network. d) Weight removed
from the remainer of the graph after the removal of the vaccinated individuals. Top: illustration of
the weights distributed among the removed (gray) and remaining (white) individuals. Solid lines
correspond to internal, dashed denote external weights being removed from the network. Bottom:
total external weight removed from the graphs when the overlap of the social and optimal target
groups are replaced by the highest-weight (solid) or randomly chosen (dashed) individuals from
the optimal group. Inset shows the ratio of internal / external weights in the two networks for
different target groups.
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Figure 11: Vaccination performance of outbreaks taking place on the social networks.
Efficient immunization strategies against epidemic that spreads via the ties in the digital social
networks. In this case, both the target individuals are selected by and the epidemic takes place on
the same social network. a) The network dynamics is also considered as they evolve in time, b)
the static aggregated networks are used and the epidemic spreads rapidly on the static links.
and static cases, and significant performance change is observed compared to the, e.g., closeness
centrality based strategy.
S5 Robustness
So far we have investigated the performance of the target group in the same period that formed
the basis for their selection, however, in case of real epidemic scenarios it is preferred to collect
data from a preceding periods so that we can infer to upcoming months. In this spirit, here we
use the target groups of February (in the index month) for monitoring and vaccination in the
consecutive months March, April and May. As an evaluation, we compare social target groups to
the colocation based groups from both the index and later months.
Figure 12 shows the infection probability and infection time observed in the social target groups
for different months, using the short-range proximity network. In the top panel, we show the
infection probability relative to the probability measures in the optimal target groups based on
the colocation data in the actual month. In all months, social target groups outperform random
monitoring, and also show similar probability values to the optimal that can be obtained using
proximity data of the same period. However, as the period in interest becomes further in time
from the index month, efficacy becomes less stable and it decreases as well. Regarding infection
time, we show the raw results in units of days compared to the optimal of the month. Again, social
groups display significantly earlier times of infection than that of random groups but they are also
less effective as the true optimal is. Interestingly, the decreasing performance trend observed in
case of infection probability is not present here and social target groups perform equally well in all
months.
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